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Summary findings
The main reason Lima failed to implement a concession  participation in water is further hampered by the social
was geographical: the scarcity of water sources meant  importance of water and by the lack of international
high marginal costs, partly for pumping water from deep  experience and the technical difficulties in designing
wells and building adequate storage for dry periods.  privatization reform in the sector. At the same time,
High extraction costs were compounded by years of  water offers fewer benefits than other utilities-few
neglect; much of the system needed to be replaced.  revenues to reward supporters or compensate losers-
Attracting private investors meant setting prices high  and the price increases likely in Peru would especially
enough to recover these high costs and provide a  hurt the urban poor, who were important  to the
reasonable return on capital.  president's support base. After a favorable start, the
But the government had subsidized costs for years, so a  political equation shifted against privatization.
concession would have required a sharp and sudden  The concession's failure was costly, in access goals not
price increase to cover marginal costs. Moreover, any  fully met, in adverse effects on health, and in the failure
forward-looking investor would want to slow the pace of  to curb consumption through metering-and  hence in
future investment by curbing demand through  more  continued  depletion of the aquifer and its increasing
effective (meter-based) bill collection. And cross-  contamination  by ocean salt.
subsidies, which reduce the incentive to conserve water,  Peru's institutional weaknesses, especially its lack of an
would also have to be reduced.  autonomous judiciary, might have limited how much
The ultimate cause of the concession's failure was  could have been achieved. But considering the net gains
geographical but the proximate cause was political.  from private operation in the much weaker institutional
Privatizing a utility is politically tricky if it involves  settings in Africa, Lima would probably have been better
higher prices and the controversial ceding of monopoly  off with a concession.
powers to private parties, especially foreigners. Private
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989-90 Peru underwent a severe economic crisis with a 5.4 percent decline in
GDP and inflation peaking at an annual rate of over 7,600 percent (World Bank 1998).
The newly elected President, Alberto Fujimori, embarked on a program of sweeping
structural reforms that turned Peru from a state-directed to a market-led economy. The
reforms changed the role of the state through the sale of more than 200 state owned
enterprises, sharply reduced state subsidies and price controls, and introduced tax, wage
and other measures designed to improve the efficiency and financial soundness of
government. Included in the program was a proposal to privatize the operation of Lima' s
water and sewerage utility, by means of a concession contract.
As we shall show, Lima's water and sewerage system was in a state of near
collapse by the time of Fujimori's election in 1990. Water is scarce in the arid coastal
region where Lima is located, and leakage, waste, and contamination of water sources
compounded this natural scarcity. The result was severe rationing and frequent
interruptions for the 75 percent of the population connected to the system, and high costs
and inconvenience for the 25 percent without direct access to piped water. In addition,
almost a third of Lima's 1991 population of 6.5 million were not connected to the
sewerage system.  Sewerage treatment was almost non-existent and Lima dumped raw
sewerage into the ocean at a rate of 17 to 18 M3 per second.  Low tariffs for water
services, lack of metering and low rates of bill collection had left SEDAPAL with neither
the incentive nor the resources to expand or maintain the system, and gave consumers2
little incentive to curb water consumption except during rationing.  The social and
external costs of the system were large: high rates of illness and death from water borne
diseases, pollution of rivers used for irrigation and of the ocean used for fishing,
depletion of the groundwater, and losses of exports and tourism during the 1991 cholera
epidemic.
Conditions thus seemed ripe for Lima's water and sewerage concession. The
water and sewerage system was in crisis and the political circumstances favored
privatization.  Yet the concession did not happen. Even though a number of reforms
short of privatization were implemented, we shall show that the welfare gains to Peru
from these were well below the potential gains had the concession gone ahead as
planned.  The objective of this study is to analyze the reforms that SEDAPAL underwent
instead of the concession, to explore the consequences of that change for water services
in Lima, and to explain why the concession was not signed.
Tlhe  next section of this study discusses the circumstances in the water sector
leading to reform.  Section III discusses the reforms that were implemented. Section IV
compares the welfare effects of reform with the concession. Section V explores the
political circumstances that explain why the operation of the water system was not
privatized.  We conclude with a discussion of the remaining problems and the
implications of the Lima case for policy.
11. CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE WATER SECTOR LEADING TO REFORM
i.  Cost and Scarcity of Raw Water. Lima's sources of raw water are scarce and
variable.  Lima is located in the coastal region of Peru, a region that receives less than 153
millimeters of rainfall a year. The river flow through this region is strongly seasonal: 25
of the 53 main rivers dry up entirely during the dry season from May to December. As a
result, the average availability of surface water in the coastal area is estimated at 2,885
M3per capita, compared to an estimated world average of 8,500 M3 (Macroconsult
1996).
Pollution aggravates the scarcity problem.  The major source of Lima's water
supply is the Rimac River, which is contaminated by heavy metals from nearby mines as
well as untreated sewerage. About a third of Lima's  water comes from wells, which
depend on a shrinking supply of groundwater.  The aquifer is increasingly polluted by
salinity when the water table near the ocean drops because of increased pumping in the
dry season (World Bank 1994).
ii. Demand and Water Tariffs. The potential demand for water was increasing
rapidly in the period before reform. Lima was growing by an average of about 2.7
percent a year from 1981-1992 as terrorism and economic factors drove rural populations
to move to low income communities on the outskirts of the city.  These so-called pueblos
jovenes  accounted for 58 percent of Lima's population of 6.5 million by 1991.
Throughout the 1980's and 1990's water and sewerage tariffs, which are
combined in Lima, were well below the opportunity cost of supply in an arid area, nor did
they reflect the social costs of pollution.  Under the populist policies of President Alan
Garcia (1985-1990), the water and sewerage tariff was allowed to decline in real terms to
the point that by 1989 the average tariff was about US$0.17 M3, less than half of the 1985
price in constant (1989) soles. Even if tariffs had been higher they would have done little
to curb consumption, since only about a third of connections were metered in 1991 and4
only about 10 percent of users were billed according to a meter reading.  Unmetered
consumers pay a flat rate regardless of what they consume and hence have no incentive to
conserve.  Moreover, much water was free -- only about 43 percent of billed amounts
were collected.
The main constraint on demand was not price but low coverage and rationing.
Only about 75 percent of the population was connected, and 48 percent of the connected
population received water service for less than 12 hours a day, 28 percent for less than
six.'  Nevertheless, water consumption in the city was 236 liters per capita per day in
1987 during the wet season when rationing was low, which is high compared to European
averages (150-200 L.p.d.). Consumption varied widely across the city, however; for
example in 1993 it ranged from highs of 567 in wealthier neighborhoods with high rates
of connection to lows of 105 in poorer zones (World Bank 1994, annex 8). About a third
of those without connections relied on standpipes or group taps, another third on water
vendors and the rest on other sources such as wells.  Vendor water was expensive, about
US$2.50 -$2.75 per cubic meter (M 3), and persons who relied on vendors consumed only
about 30 I.p.d. (World Bank 1994).
iii. Management. Mismanagement added to the water shortages and serious
sanitation problems.  Massive amounts of water were wasted: unaccounted for water was
43 percent of production in 1991. Some two thirds of these losses were due to leakage;
the rest was consumed but not billed.
Rationing costs have been estimated at US$0.27 M3, assuming the cost of a household water storage
reservoir is US$1,000; operation and maintenance costs are 5 percent of the investment costs; the economic
life of the investment is 15 years with a discount rate of 10 percent.  If physical losses are 30 percent, than
the cost per M3 consumed is about US$0.38. (World Bank 1994)5
The utility, SEDAPAL (Servicio de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Lima) had
little incentive to reduce UFW in order to sell more water.  SEDAPAL's tariff did not
cover even its operating costs and it was unable to cut off and punish non-payers.  More
importantly SEDAPAL did not have the money to replace leaking pipes or increase
metering in order to reduce waste. Not only was it making losses, but also it could not
borrow after President Garcia unilaterally reduced foreign debt payments to 10 percent of
the owed amount in 1988. As its liquidity situation worsened, the company also stopped
paying its debts and by 1993 had US$45 million of external debt in arrears.  SEDAPAL
depended on government transfers to meet its current expenditures and these were also
declining as the central government's fiscal crisis worsened under President Garcia.  As a
result, in the late 1980's the company reduced its investrnent in expansion and even
maintenance investment fell: investment per 1000 connections fell from US$28.6 in 1987
to a low of US$16.6 in 1988. From 1987 to 1989 only about 3 kilometers of water pipe
were replaced in a system with more than 6,700 kilometers (World Bank 1994).
SEDAPAL's lack of resources also meant that close to two million people were
not connected to the sewerage system.  In addition, the sewerage system was suffering
from lack of maintenance: close to 85 percent of the pipes needed to be replaced in older
parts of the city.  Only about five percent of sewage was treated.
iv. Externalities.  The scarcity of water and the pollution problems had major
social costs.  Because of supply interruptions, even people with connections were storing
water under unsanitary conditions. People without connections spent hours queuing at
public standpipes. 2 Lack of water also meant that personal hygiene was often
2  One person  reported  a total  time of seven  hours a day  queuing  during  the dry season  (Webb  and
Associates,  1992).6
substandard. Inadequate  sewerage  disposal  added to health problems;  in particular,
foodstuffs  were contaminated  by the dumping  of raw sewerage  into rivers used for
irrigation  and into the ocean used for fishing. As a consequence,  waterbome  and water
related  diseases  were a major cause of morbidity  and mortality,  especially  in poorer
neighborhoods  of Lima. 3 The medical  costs and lost wages from such diseases  were a
high part of household  income for the poor, 27 percent by one estimate. 4 The situation
contributed  to a cholera epidemic  centered  in Lima  in 1991  during which  almost 3,000
people died throughout  Peru.
IH.  REFORM OF LIMA'S  WATER AND SEWERAGE  SYSTEM
Partly in preparation for privatization and partly in compliance with the World
Bank project, the government instituted a number of important reforms in water
regulation and in the operations of the utility during the 1990's.  This section considers
and discusses the consequences of the main changes.
i.  Tariff Reform. As figure 1 shows, the government reversed the decline in the
real price of water and sewerage (SEDAPAL does not charge separately), raising real
tariffs from an average of US$ 0.17 per M3 in 1989 to US$ 0.41 in 1995 and 1996 (1996
prices).  Notwithstanding these increases, average tariffs were still below the 1994
estimated marginal cost of water and sewerage of US$0.45 (World Bank 1994).
Furthermore, tariffs continued to be badly distorted.  By the end of 1998,
SEDAPAL was still charging a small fixed charge (US$0.90) and five different variable
charges: (i) social (for hospitals, charities and public standpipes), (ii) residential, (iii)
3 The Pueblos  J6venes  reported  eight episodes  of diarrhea  per person a year (World  Bank 1994).7
government, (iv) commercial, and (v) industrial. 5 Initially, the rate of increase for social
and residential tariffs was somewhat higher than for other uses, which reduced cross
subsidies slightly, but this has been reversed somewhat since 1993 (Figure 1). For
example, in 1989 industrial rates were 170 percent higher than residential; this fell to 130
percent in 1993, then rose to 160 percent in 1996.6  Although rates are highest for
industrial users, these fall mostly on smaller industries, since large industries can afford
to drill their own boreholes.
Figure 1. Average Water Tariff
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Only 39 percent of connections were metered by 1996, and only 15 percent of
connections had meters that were read (see statistical appendix table 3); an unknown but
even smaller number were actually charged according to their meters. 7 Metering varied
by type of user, with a greater proportion of industrial users charged according to a
4  Webb and Associates estimated the medical cost income costs of water borne diseases at US$13 per
capita a year in 1992. Average family size is five persons and household income is US$240.
5 The connection charge in 1998 for water was US$224 and for sewerage, US$296.
6 The residential rates were US$0.18 per M3 compared to industrial tariffs of USS0.49 in 1989; by 1996 the
rates were US$0.33 and US$0.85 respectively.
' In 1992 only 8 percent were charged according to a meter (LMG Consultants).  These data are not strictly
comparable, however, because SEDAPAL has contracted out metering and meter reading.8
meter. 8 Consumers who were not charged according to their meter reading were charged
on the basis of estimated consumption volumes that varied by type of consumer and type
of neighborhood (see statistical appendix table 4) as well as by number of interruptions.
SEDAPAL's consumption estimates were often higher than actual consumption because
interruptions in service were not fully taken into account, a source of consumer
complaints.
Notwithstanding the increase in real tariffs, Lima's pricing regime provided no
incentive for unmetered consumers to conserve water.  Indeed the price increases had the
opposite effect, encouraging consumers to try to increase consumption at least to the
amount for which they are billed and encouraging large industrial users to drill their own
wells. Currently SEDAPAL estimates that average demand in Lima has increased to the
equivalent of 460 liters per capita per day, above that of cities with ample water sources,
although rationing keeps per capita sales much lower.  On the other hand, higher prices
gave SEDAPAL the incentive and wherewithal to reduce physical water losses and
pursue bill collection more rigorously, as we discuss in more detail in the section on
SEDAPAL's operations'below.
A weakness of the reform was the failure to implement an objective price setting
formula. Tariff regulation was defined in the water and Sanitation Law (Ley 26338,
1994) and its Reglamento (DS 09-95, 1995). However, SUNASS deternined  that the
application of the new tariff regime would be gradual. The implementation of the new
tariff system has three stages: preparatory, improvement, and definite. During the
preparatory stage, the financial feasibility of the water utility will be stressed so that the
8 In 1988  about a third  of industrial  consumers  were charged  according  to a meter  versus 16  percent  of
residential  users (see  statistical  appendix  Table  3).9
enterprises will cover their operation costs. During the improvement stage, the
enterprises should index, in a term of five years, their tariffs to the variation of wholesale
price index - every time 3% is surpassed. Finally, at the definite stage, tariffs should
reflect the long-term marginal cost and they would be simply be adjusted according to
the inflation. However, the schedule established to advance through the system stages
has not been fulfilled and tariffs are still basically adjusted on the basis to cover
operating costs..  In mid-1997 the regulator ordered SEDAPAL to bring estimated
consumption closer to actual hours of water supplied, reduce the dispersion in tariffs and
the number of user categories for commercial and industrial users and reduce the number
of categories of residential consumers used to estimate consumption from 10 to 4
(SUNASS, Boletin Infornativo, No. 3, 1997). Even with these changes, however, the
price regime  continued to send distorted signals to consumers and the utility.
ii. Regulatory Framework.  In preparation for private participation several laws
were passed from 1991 to 1994 that, among other things, established financial viability as
one of the principles for tariff setting. They also consolidated water regulation under
MIPRE and created a new regulatory body for water services, the National
Superintendency of Sanitary Services, SUJNASS  (Superintendencia Nacional de Servicios
de Saneamiento). 9 The new framework had several serious weaknesses, most notably, (i)
it lacked a clear delineation of the function and purpose of the regulator and other actors
in the sector, (ii) the regulator was not sufficiently autonomous from government, (iii) the
9  Specifically,  the private  investment  law (D.L.  #697)  of November  1991  incorporated  SEDAPAL  into  the
privatization  process;  D.L. # 25738  consolidated  regulation  of the sector  under  the Infrastructure  Vice-
Ministry  and PRONAP  (Programa  Nacional  de Agua  Potable  y Alcantarillado).  D.L. # 25965  in December
1992  created  SUNASS  with  responsibility  to supervise  water  and sewerage  enterprises;  and the General
Law  of Sanitation  Service,  D.L. # 26338  in July 1994  defined  new institutional  responsibilities  for the10
regulator was organizationally weak, (iv) there were no viable mechanisms for conflict
resolution, and, (v) the regulation contained provisions not fully supportive of private
participation in water, all described below.  As a result, the framework would not support
reforms of the type envisioned in the concession. The regulation failed to provide
credible commitment to future private investors that their returns would not be threatened
by politically motivated under-pricing or other forms of confiscation, or credible
assurance to consumers that the regulator could not be captured.
The first problem, a lack of clarity in roles, arose because SUNASS was not only
supposed to regulate the water service enterprises, but also to promote and strengthen
them.  As other countries with this mix of roles have found, Chile for example, the task of
promotion harms the arms length relationship a regulator must maintain to assure
objectivity and neutrality.  This role confusion was illustrated by the remarks of the
former Superintendent, Ms. Lidia Oblitas, who stated that SUNASS cannot regulate very
weak water service enterprises that lack resources.  She explained that SUNASS instead
tries to strengthen these companies first, and only then demands that they comply with
the rules (El Comercio, November 9, 1994, confirmed in field interviews in 1997).
Another confusion arose because of the conflict between the role of SUNASS and
PRONAP.  Some of PRONAP's responsibilities overlapped with SUNASS' regulatory
powers.  For example, PRONAP was empowered to propose a subsidy policy similar to
Chile's income support for water bills (Ochoa 1997), and to develop accounting
techniques and financial models for water enterprises.  Conflicts between the two entities
were regarded as a major problem by officials of both SUNASS and PRONAP as well as
sector and established  transparency,  financial  viability  and social  equity  as the basic  principles  to govern
tariff setting  and called for autonomous  and commercially  viable  water companies.11
sector authorities in MIPRE and experts consulted in the World Bank and Inter-American
Development Bank (field interviews).'0
Autonomy was the second regulatory problem. SUNASS received two percent of
all tariff revenues, making it financial self-sufficient, yet it was still vulnerable to
political intervention.  Unlike other regulatory bodies in Peru, such as the regulator for
telecommunications, SUNASS did not have a board or governing council in which
government was only one of several stakeholders, as a way to insulate it from direct
intervention by the ministry.  Instead, all power was vested in the Superintendent, who
was a political appointee and until recently reported to MIPRE and could be removed by
the Ministry at any time.  This was a problem for relations with SEDAPAL, which unlike
the other water companies that were attached to their municipality or province, reported
directly to MIPRE.  The new law (# 26922 February 1998) partly solved this problem by
putting all regulatory agencies under the Presidential Council of Ministers.
A third problem was SUNASS' organizational weaknesses.  Although SUNASS,
like other regulatory bodies, could pay as much as other regulators and above civil
service levels, it had proportionately fewer technically qualified staff - less than five
percent of professionals have graduate studies -- than regulators for telecommunications,
electricity or consumer and market loyal competition protection. Moreover, over one
forth of SLTNASS  staff came from the former supervisory body for water, and brought
with then an approach that focussed more on control than on regulation (field interviews).
Fourth, there were no adequate mechanisms for enforcement or conflict
resolution.  The law allowed SUNASS to assess a penalty of up to 30 percent of an
enterprise's revenues for failure to comply with the regulation, but at least until the end of
'0 PRONAP  was  designed  as  temporary  and  scheduled  to disappear  but it existence  has been  expanded.12
1998 this power had never been used. According to SUNASS' tariff supervisor, the
regulator had never assessed a penalty because there was no provision for what would
happen if the enterprise failed to comply with the penalty (field interview).  Under
present circumstances with a weak regulator and a publicly owned utility, the absence of
a neutral mechanism for conflict resolution has not been an issue, but it might become
one should private participation be used in the future.  The law provides for a water
company to appeal SUNASS' decisions to the courts, but the weakness of the judiciary
reduces the credibility of the regulatory framework. In interviews, foreign investors cite
the corruption and political nature of the judiciary as a particularly negative aspect of
Peru's current investment environment (Barthelemy 1996).
Finally, the water system regulation did not fully support private participation.
For example, the General Law of Sanitary Services included a provision stating that
"tariffs can be modified in the event that the interest of the population is affected by the
privatization process (Law No. 26338, July 1994, authors' translation)." None of the
legislation specifies how private enterprise tariffs will be set and is ambiguous on details
of the concession process.
iii.  Reforms in SEDAPAL. In preparation for the concession and to comply with
the requirements of the World Bank project, SEDAPAL began a program of restructuring
in 1992, that continued after the concession was postponed.  The project funds combined
with the increased revenues resulting from tariff increases allowed the company to
improve its financial performance and increase investment. These changes also helped
ease the pressure for the concession.13
Through voluntary retirement SUNASS reduced the number of workers from
3,769 in 1988 to 1,359 in 1996, at the same time the number of connections was
expanding, so workers per 1,000 connections fell from over 6 to 2.  This reduction in the
labor force was accomplished partly by removing redundant workers and partly by
outsourcing activities that were previously done in-house, especially bill collection and
maintenance, installation and repair of connections.  As a result, labor costs fell sharply.
Even though outsourcing raised administrative and maintenance expenses and electricity
costs increased, overall operating expenses per cubic meter of water sold stayed fairly
constant (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Operating Cost per Cubic Meter of Water Sold
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SEDAPAL also introduced a number of reforms designed to change management
and personnel incentives in 1996. This included a performance-based pay system with
specific targets for each employee and quarterly bonuses of up to 10 percent of pay."'
Partly as a result, the average annual salary of SEDAPAL's personnel began to increase
in real terms, as can be seen in Figure 3.
" To implement this change management won agreement of the union for the 55 percent of staff that is
unionized.14
Figure 3. Average Annual Salary
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The reduction in labor expenses and the rise in tariffs allowed SEDAPAL to make
a profit in 1993 for the first time in more than a decade.  Further price increases, as well
as improvements in billing and collection have kept SEDAPAL solvent (Figure 4).
Figure 4. SEDAPAL Profits
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The increase in SEDAPAL's liquidity and the World Bank project allowed a
surge in investment in expansion and maintance.  As Figure 5 shows, investment per
connection rose from US$26 in 1990 to US$80 by 1996.  Most of the investment has
been earmarked for expansion and there has been less emphasis on rehabilitiation and
maintenance of the existing network.15
Figure 5. Annual Investment per Thousand Connection
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IV.  THE  EFFECTS  OF THE REFORM  ON PERFORMANCE  AND WELFARE
This section shows the impact of the reforms described in the previous section on
several performance measures and then compares their welfare effects with those that
might have been achieved under the concession.
i. The Effects of the Reform on Performance. Additional funding from the World
Bank project and higher water tariffs enabled SEDAPAL to add close to 200,000
additional water connections between 1989 and 1996 (figure 6).  This growth in
connections only allowed the company to keep pace with Lima's rising population,
however, and the coverage ratio of 70 percent barely changed (figure 7).  Moreover, the
quality of service does not seem to have improved. For example, field interviews suggest
that some districts of Lima received no water service for more than two months in 1997.16
Figure 6. Thousands of Water Connections
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The efficiency improvements in SEDAPAL did not have a sustained effect on
unaccounted-for-water.  UFW fell from close to 50 percent in 1987 to a low of about 27
percent in 1992 but then began to increase again (figure 8). By 1996 it was 36 percent.17
Figure 8. Unaccountedfor Water
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Furthermore, the changes in management and incentives did not lead to any
measurable improvement in total factor productivity (figure 9).
Figure 9. Total Factor Productivity
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ii.  Methodology for  Calculating the Welfare Effects. What  would have been the
net benefits to Peru had the concession with a private operator been signed and fully
implemented?  Using a partial equilibrium, cost-benefit methodology developed by
Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang (1990), we compared the actual reform outcome with a
counterfactual projected on the basis of the draft concession contract (CEPRI-SEDEPAL18
1994).  12 We assumed that the private operator would invest to meet all of the minimum
requirements in the concession, using retained earnings and borrowing.  According to the
concession document, the winning bidder would be responsible for all financial risk and
capital expenditures as well as take over all the company's liabilities, in return for all
profits from operating the concession for 30 years. The concession also required the
company to increase the company's paid in capital by US$ 100 million in the first five
years, increase water service from 15 to 24 hours a day in five years, expand market
coverage from 75% to 95% in ten years, and raise metered connections from 38% to 95%
of total connections in ten years.  Unaccounted-for water was required to drop from 36 to
25 percent.'3
It is doubtless unrealistic to assume that the winner bidder will meet all the terms
of the concession. However, without any reasonable basis on which to adjust the
concession terms, we chose to project the concession as drafted and then see if the
magnitude of the gain would be large if we discounted it by 50 percent.
We assumed that a private operator would be able  to improve further
SEDAPAL's operating efficiency, hence we projected rather conservatively that the
concession operator would reduce the use of intermediate inputs by 5 percent.  However,
we expected that any firther  improvement in labor over and above the cuts already
introduced would be unlikely.  Finally, we assumed that the opportunity cost of capital
would not change.
12 We projected performance under the concession for ten years (from 1994 to 2004), which required us
also to project the actual case for eight years beyond our data, and compared the results under the
concession with what actually occurred.
13  According to the concession document the qualified international operator must retain at least 25% of
newly-issued shares. Employees must receive at least 5% of new shares, and at least 20% of the new shares
must be issued in the stock exchange. In the base scenario, we assumed that the international corporation
retains 75% of the stocks.19
The concession was to be awarded to the bidder who offered the lowest average
water tariff.  The maximum allowable increase for the first year was 40 percent and
afterwards tariffs would be increased according to a factor K plus inflation.  K was set to
zero for the first five years, after which K would vary depending on investment and
efficiency improvements.  For our base projections we assumed that all bidders would
increase prices to cover marginal costs (using the World Bank estimate of US$0.45) or by
about 38 percent, with no further real increases during the projection period. We also
expected that a bidder who offered a lower retail price increase would be more likely to
renegotiate the concession later in order to reduce the investment requirements; hence the
net effect on our projected consumer surplus would be similar to our base projection.
We compared the concession projections with SEDAPAL's actual performance,
projected to 2004 based on linear trends from 1988 to 1996. Residential and non-
residential demand was estimated for both the actual and counterfactual using the
following methodology.  We assume that total demand (TQ) is a function of population
(N) times the individual demand curve (a -b p), where a is the demand when the marginal
price (p) is zero, such that:
(1)  TQ, = N, (a - bp)
The elasticity of demand is assumed to be -0.30  for metered residential customers
and -0.20 for non-residential; unmetered customers are assumed to have an elasticity of
zero since their volume of consumption is unaffected by price. 14  We assume that an
individual's  demand curve remains the same under the actual and the counterfactual and
14 To our knowledge, there is no study of the demand elasticity for Lima. We thus arbitrarily assigned a
plausible elasticity based on the literature and the elasticity in other Latin American cities.  Later we shall
check the sensitivity of the welfare results to these assumptions.20
that the total demand consists of all the residents of the SEDAPAL service area, in other
words that the unconnected population constitutes excess demand. Given the relative low
price of water and sewerage when the reforms began, this assumption seems justified.
We also assume that, when facing excess demand, rationing is based on willingness-to-
pay) 5 From these assumptions we obtain two equations and two unknowns, a and b:
- _  d  In TQ.le.ed  - -bN  Pmetered
d In  Pee  eted  TQt,ed
Q.mtered  =N.eted  (a-  bP)
coverage  x  continuity  (a-
Coverage is the percentage of population with access to connections and
continuity is the hours that a connected resident has access to water divided by 24 hours.
We assume that for half of the interrupted hours the residents still have access to water
from personal water storage facilities.  We arbitrarily take the last year of our data set,
1996, to calculate our demand function in order to estimate the consumer surplus
associated with any price and quantity pair. The demand function for unmetered
individuals is then assumed to have the same a and b parameters as for metered
consumers, although we treated the marginal prices differently.  We then estimated
consumer surplus using the same methodology described in Annex B of the Chile case
(Shirley, Xu, and Zuluaga, 2000).  In calculating consumer surplus, we assume that
excess demand is allocated by willingness-to-pay.
iM.  Welfare Effects.  The total welfare effects of the concession are the sum of the
differences between the actual and counterfactual projections of consumer surplus,
is  Later we shall present sensitivity test with respect to random rationing.21
employee welfare, government revenue, and investors' revenue.  This calculation
suggests that the concession would have yielded significant gains totaling US$864.03
million (net present value in 1994 dollars) for the period 1994-2004. Many of these gains
would have gone to foreign investors, but if we deduct their gains, the total improvement
in domestic welfare is still substantial, US$557.80 million.  Foreign gains are large
because we assumed that they would own 50 percent of the stock of the private operator,
although the concession draft only requires the strategic investor to own 25 percent.  If
we relax that assumption, domestic gains would be much higher, as we show in the next
section.  We can get a sense of the magnitude of the gains by calculating the annual gain
as a percentage of the annual sales of SEDAPAL in the last pre-privatization year (1994).
Thus, the domestic gain from the concession would have been almost 40 percent of
annual sales, in perpetuity (see Table 1).
Table 1. The Distribution of Welfare Changes: Base Scenario
NPV (94US$MM)  Annual  Annual Welfare
1995-2004  Percentage  per
Gain  to 1994  Group
Output  94US$)
GOVERNMENT  12.45  0.88%
EMPLOYEES  30.02  2.11%  1,579.32 per  employee
DOMESTIC  INVESTORS  264.20  18.57%
FOREIGN  INVESTORS  306.23  21.53%
CONSUMERS  251.12  17.65%  32.92  per  connection
TOTAL  DOMESTIC  WELFARE  557.80  39.21%  8.46  per  capita
TOTAL  WELFARE  864.03  60.74% 
Despite price increases, consumers are better off by US$251 million or about
US$33 per connection annually, thanks to the increased coverage and more continuous
service projected under the concession. Employees are better off because they own five
percent of shares; their gains amounts to about US$1,579 per employee per year.  The22
new owners of the company, foreign and domestic, are the biggest winners, while
government is only better off by about US$12.45 million. This is because under the
concession it would lose the quasi rents that it received as owner of SEDAPAL, which
would now accrue to the investors as the return on their capital. This reflects the fact that
to encourage large new investment under private operation these quasi-rents can no
longer be confiscated by government.
This calculation underestimates the benefits because it is not possible for us to
include externalities or the direct social benefits to consumers. If indeed the concessions
brought water and sewerage to 95 percent of Lima in 10 years, the health improvements
and savings in time queuing would be considerable. The rapid increase in prices and
metering would have reduced demand and the UFW targets would have brought down
losses, conserving a scarce resource. Better sewerage coverage would allow the city to
safely recharge the aquifer with rainwater.
iv. Sensitivity Tests. To test the sensitivity of the results to alternative
assumptions, we experimented with changing one parameter and kept the rest of the base
scenario the same.  In this way we tested our assumptions about how water demand was
satisfied, price elasticity, price increases, foreign ownership shares and efficiency of
private operation.  As reported in table 2, the total gain changes very little except when
we assume that excess demand is rationed randomly instead of by willingness-to-pay. If
the pool of consumers who were without a connection at the time of the reform included
many people who were willing to pay a lot to be connected, then consumer surplus and
total welfare gains would be much higher.  Random rationing is not a plausible
assumption for Lima, however, since we know that most of the unconnected population23
was poor and that wealthy people who were not connected had their own sources of
water.
Table 2. Sensitivity Analysis
(Annualized  net present  value  in millions  of 1994  US dollars  as  percentage  of 1994  sales)
Welfare/  INVESTORS  TOTAL  TOTAL
1994 Sales  GOV.  WORKERS  CONSUMERS DOMESTIC  WELFARE
FOREIGN  DOMESTIC  WELFARE
Base  0.88%  21.53%  18  .57%  2.11%  17.65%  39.21%  60.74%
Random Rationing  0.88%  21.53%  18.57%  2.11%  31.53%  53.09%  74.62%
Elasticity of 5%
more  0.88%  21.53%  18.57%  2.11%  16.73%  38.29%  59.82%
Elasticity of 5%
less  0.87%  21.53%  18.57%  2.11%  19.02%  40.58%  62.11%
Price Increase
40%  2.10%  21.92%  18.91%  2.15%  17.04%  40.19%/  62.11%
25% Foreign
Ownership  0.88%  10.55%  29.55%  2.11%  17.65%  50.19%  60.74%
75% Foreign
Ownership  0.88%  31.66%  8.44%  2.11%  17.65%  29.08%  60.74%
Equal Cost of Int.
Inputs  -1.99%  20.64%  17.81%  2.02%  17.65%  35.50%  56.14%
As table 2 shows, changing assumptions about the initial price increase and
elasticities change the consumer surplus only slightly.  Changing assumptions about the
ownership of the company has large effects only on the distribution of gains between
foreign and domestic owners of the private operating company. Not surprisingly, if the
private operator is not more efficient in using intermediate inputs that the publicly
operated SEDAPAL, then welfare will decrease, although the magnitude is not large
because our base assumption was conservative.
iv. Welfare Effects ofActual Reforms. Using the same methodology, we estimated
the welfare gains from the reforms that actually occurred compared to no reform at all.
Since the quality of the data for 1990-1991 was poor because of hyperinflation, we relied
largely on data from 1987 to 1989 to predict the behavior of SEDAPAL without reform24
to 1996, our last year of observations for the factual.  We assumed that SEDAPAL would
have followed the trend from 1987 to 1989 without the reforms.
Table 3. Welfare Effects of the 1992 Reforms
(Net  present values  in millions  of 1994  US$  and percent  of 1992  Sales)
GOV.  INVESTORS  WORKERS CONSUMERS  TOTAL  TOTAL
DOMESTIC  WELFARE
1992  Reform  FOREIGN  DOMESTIC  WELFARE
Welfare/  10.34%  0.00%  0.00%  -14.14%  14.78%  10.98%  10.98%
1992  Sales
Welfare/  6.65%  0.00%  0.00%  -9.10%  9.51%  7.06%  7.06%
1994  Sales
Millions  of  38.13  0.00  0.00  -52.17  54.52  40.49  40.49
1994  Dollars
Total domestic  welfare  is the same  as total welfare  since  there  were no foreign  players.
Table 3 reports the welfare gains of reforms as a percent of SEDAPAL's  sales in
1992, the base year in which reforms started, and in 1994, to allow comparison with the
gains from the concession shown in table 1. The reforms led to total welfare gains of
about US$40 million (net present value in 1994 US dollars), or an annual gain of 11
percent of SEDAPAL's  1992 sales in perpetuity (7 percent of 1994 sales). Government
gains by some US$38 million, thanks to the increase in quasi-rents with higher prices.
Consumers gained by US$54 million, which reflects the increase in connections net of
the effect of higher prices.  Workers were the only losers, worse off by about US$52
million, because of the effects of forced early retirements.
These calculations suggest that the welfare effects from the partial reforms are
much less than the gains under the concession.  Consumer surplus is almost four and a
half time larger with the concession.  This suggests that even if only half the concession's
goals had been attained, consumers would still be two and a half time better off than
under the actual reforms.25
How unrealistic were the concession's goals? We have raised some doubts about
Peru's regulatory credibility, but that did not prevent investment in other infrastructure.
Moreover, Lima's  concession tender attracted three bidders who invested an estimated
US$1 million each to prequalify.  One serious problem was affordability.  The fact that
the price of a house in the slums would increase fourfold if it had a water connection
suggests that people would have been willing to pay a great deal more for piped water if
they could finance the connection. Connection charges, however, would probably not
have been affordable to many poor people without a better form of financing (better than
the efforts made under the FONAVI program).  If the experience of Buenos Aires is any
indication, the operator might have pushed government to make new connections
affordable to more people through cross subsidies or through the provision of subsidized
credit to the poor.  Another serious problem was scarcity.  Even assuming reduced
consumption through metering and better maintenance, and investment in storage and
sources of supply, the water scarcity is such that the provision  of water without
interruption to all Lima's population in the medium term is likely to be very high.
The partial reforms are better for government than a concession because
government can retain the quasi-rents from higher prices, but the consumers lose because
of much lower investment.  In other words, under a concession the higher prices give the
private investors a return on their capital which they invest to expand and maintain the
system, while under the partial reforms that actually took place, prices go up less quickly
and government retains some of the quasi-rents and invests less.26
V. POLITICAL ANALYSIS  OF THE REFORM DIVISION
Although the water system was in a state of collapse by 1990, that crisis was not a
sufficient condition for reform.  The circumstances that precipitated change were
political.  Politics also explain why the concession was not signed.  As we discuss below,
reform occurs only when three necessary conditions are met: (i) the reform is politically
desirable, i.e. the political benefits to the president or other reformers outweigh the
political costs; (ii) the reform is politically feasible, i.e. those favoring reform control the
levels of power (such as the legislature and the judiciary) and opposition to the reform
cannot prevent its implementation; (iii) the reform is credible, i.e. the promises the
government makes to implement and sustain the reform, to reward the winners and
compensate the losers, are credible to investors, opponents and other groups who might
otherwise derail the reform by refusing to go along (World Bank 1995). As we shall
show, the SEDAPAL concession initially met all three conditions, but a change in
circumstances changed the political equation.
i.  The Failure of Traditional Politics.  To understand the politics of water
privatization, we must first understand the circumstances that brought President
Fujimori to power in 1990 and made reform of Lima's water system a possibility.
Throughout the 1960's and 70's Peru was governed by a succession of authoritarian and
democratic governments pursuing generally populist policies.  A 1968 coup installed a
military government that greatly increased the state's role in the economy and the number
of state enterprises (from 18 to 174). As the economic situation deteriorated under their
rule, the military decided to restore elections, and introduced a new constitution in 1978.27
Although the two democratically elected presidents who followed came from
different political backgrounds, both regimes were characterized by increased state
spending, rule by decree, economic decline and corruption.  President Alan Garcia, who
ruled from 1985 to  1990, froze the prices of many commodities including water,
unilaterally reduced payments on Peru's foreign debt to 10 percent of obligations, and
increased deficit spending, contributing to a deep financial crisis and hyperinflation.1 6 In
addition, rising terrorism contributed to a sense of widespread insecurity and growing
disillusionment with government.  By March 1989 only 23 percent of those polled in
Lima reported that they trusted the President, 20 percent trusted the legislature or the
judiciary and 17 percent trusted the political parties, compared to 42 percent who
reported they trusted the military (table 5).
The economic crisis and hyperinflation also led most people to prefer a more
market-oriented economy to the state directed economy of the last three decades (Table
4). A poll in August 1989 found that 50 percent of the population in Lima agreed that
state enterprises should be privatized (84 percent of those in the highest income group
compared to only 32 percent in the lowest, Rodrich 1991).
16 Between 1987  and 1990  GDP decreased  23.4 percent in  real terms while inflation  reached  2,775  percent
in 1989.28
Table 4. Attitudes Towards Market Reforms (In Lima)
(percentage in agreement)
April  1989  July  1990  August  1991  April  1993
Foreign  investment  should  be  promoted  71  87  84  76
Private  firms  are  favorable  for  the  country  63  70  80  73
The  market-oriented  economy  is the  most  54  58  72  58
Convenient  for  the  country
The  state  should  give  productive  activities  51  56  59  57
To  the  private  sector
Most  state  owned  enterprises  should  be  49  48  58  51
Privatized
SOURCE:  Opinion  Reports  -APOYO.
The 1990 election was held in this context of crisis and distrust of traditional
political organizations.  Initially the independent candidate, Mario Vargas Llosa, with
strong backing from the business community and right wing parties, won public support
for his program of radical economic reform and privatization.  However, he was
ultimately defeated in a runoff by a relatively unknown independent, Alberto Fujimori,
who had few ties to the political elite and promised vague, heterodox policies.  Fujimori
won the support of the lower middle and lowest income groups, partly because they
feared Vargas Llosa would institute an economic austerity program that would injure
them, but also because they identified Vargas Llosa with the traditional "rich" and
"white" political forces.
Lima was an important source of Fujimori's support.  In the first round of the
election he won 33.5 percent of the vote in Lima, compared to 29.1 percent in the entire
country; in the run off he won 65.2 percent of Lima compared to 62.5 percent in all of
Peru.  Polls suggest that within Lima, poorer voters were his strongest base.  A poll in29
July 1990, shortly after the election in April, found that among those with average
monthly family incomes between US$200 and US$240, who comprise about 43 percent
of Lima's households, Fujimori's rate of approval was 72 percent compared to only 32
percent approval among those whose average monthly family income was between
US$3,200 and US$5,000, who make up the top 4.5 percent of households.' 7
Despite this support base, Fujimori proceeded to implement a program of radical
reforms very similar to that of his opponent for reasons we explain in the next section.
ii.  Political Conditions Favoring Reform. The economic crisis, hyperinflation and
terrorism had reached a point where the new President had little choice but to institute
change.  By moving rapidly and decisively, he might be able to turn around the economic
situation, defeat the terrorists, and win back his support group.  Fujimori's  decision to
implement a reform program that was not favored by his constituent base was also based
on the possibility that radical reforms could win the support of three important veto
players.  These veto players who could help him retain power and provide financing that
he could use to regain support of his core constituency later were: the military, Peruvian
private investors, foreign investors and financial institutions, and both private and
bilateral and international aid agencies.
Shortly after taking office President Fujimori radically reduced tariffs, subsidies
and price controls.  For example, the price of gasoline was increased by a factor of 30 in
one day.  He also drastically cut government spending and introduced restrictive fiscal
and monetary policies.  He began to redefine the role of the state in the economy by
privatizing state enterprises, reducing regulation of financial and labor markets, and
17 Apoyo Opinion  Reports. The Fujimori  administration's  approval  rate for the two household  income
groups  between  these two extremes  was about 50 percent.30
introducing monetary and tax adjustments.  He also moved to reduce terrorism and
capture the terrorist leaders.'8 He instituted these changes by decree, ignoring legislative
and judicial obstacles and bypassing the traditional ministries and strengthening the
Ministry of the Presidency (MIPRE).  Tensions with the legislative and judiciary rose
throughout this period and these two branches formed the principal opposition to the
reform program.
This approach paid off both economically and politically.  Economically the most
important change was a rapid drop in inflation, from a monthly rate of 398 percent in
August 1990 to 4 percent by the end of 1992. The decline in GDP was halted and then
reversed; GDP grew by over 6 percent in 1993 and over 13 percent in 1994.19 The
reforms had negative effects on the poor, however.
The political effects were strongly positive.  After an initial drop in popularity,
public approval of President Fujimori rose -- from 30 percent shortly after the election to
60 percent in November of 1991 (Apoyo Opinion Reports).  He won the support of the
military, which in April 1992 collaborated when he dismissed the Congress and the
Judiciary in a so-called autogolpe, or self-inflicted coup d'etat.  The autogolpe
consolidated the President's  power and added to his popularity. It was supported by 80
percent of the population according to polls (Apoyo Opinion Reports).  The capture of
the leader of the Shining Path terrorist organization (Abimael Guzman) and a decline in
18  Culminating  in the capture  of Abimael  Guzman,  top leader  of the Shining  Path or Sendero  Luminoso,  in
September  of 1992.
19  The GDP growth  rates were:
YEAR  %  YEAR  %
1987  8.5  1991  7.0
1988  - 8.4  1992  - 1.8
1989  -11.7  1993  6.4
1990  - 5.4  1994  13.131
terrorist activities further enhanced the new regime's political strength.  Trust in the
presidency as an institution was very high by 1992, as was trust in Fujimori's allies:
private firms and the military.  Trust in the President's main opponent organizations, the
traditional political parties, the judiciary, unions and, to a lesser extent, the Senate,
continued low according to surveys in Lima; see Table 5.20
Table 5. Do You Trust the Following Institutions?
(Percentage of trust in Lima)
Institution  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
(March)  (Sept.)  (Sept.)  (Sept.)  (Sept.)  (Sept.)  (Sept.)  (Sept.)
Private Firms  --  63  --  53  63  65  64  49
Military Forces  42  58  47  57  66  59  68  55
President  23  57  26  54  60  63  72  56
Council of Ministers  --  --  24  37  43  44  48  43
Senate  20  47  19  --  44  42  52  41
Unions  --  35  --  20  32  32  35  34
Judiciary  20  23  22  28  34  33  36  39
Political Parties  17  21  13  13  11  14  19  18
SOURCE: Opinion Reports - APOYO.
Investors perception also began to change; for example, studies comparing Peru's
business environment with that of 30 other developing countries ranked Peru last in 1989;
it had risen to third rank by 1991.21  Another sign of growing confidence in Peru's
economy was an improvement in the face value of Peru's external debt trading in world
20  Other signs of weakness of the unions were the drop in union membership from one third of the labor
force in the seventies to 12 percent at the beginning of the nineties, and a drop in strikes (man hours lost to
strikes fell from 38 million in 1983 to 15 million in 1990).
21 Study by the Futures Group updated for 1991 by Apoyo. The ranking was based on: trade liberalization,
exchange rate policies, liberalization of financial markets, prices and salaries, fiscal and monetary policies,
privatization, attitude towards foreign investment, information, property rights, government management,
legal and accounting systems, and infrastructure.32
capital markets.  It rose from 4 percent of face value in July 1990 to over 17 percent by
July  1992 and 69 percent in July 1993. The government also won the support of bilateral
aid agencies (notably Japan) which provided funds to restore Peru's credit standing with
the World Bank and the IMF.
iii.  The Political Conditions  for the Privatization of SEDAPAL.  Fujimori's
strategy, as we just described, was to implement a very rapid and decisive reform that
would concentrate the negative effects on the poorer population in the early part of the
new administration's  term in office ("honeymoon period"), and later in his period in
office restore growth and support.  Thus the administration began quickly to implement
its plan to privatize more than 200 state owned enterprises (SOEs) in two and a half
years, i.e., by mid-1994.  Included in this plan was a concession to operate the state
owned water utility, SEDAPAL. 22
Privatization was critical to the success of the entire reform program.  It would
improve the fiscal situation by generating capital, including much needed foreign
exchange, and reducing transfers to SOEs that were hemorrhaging funds -- the SOE
deficit was 0.5 percent of GDP in 1991. It would also attract funds for badly needed
investments in key infrastructure services that the government could not afford to
finance.  Finally, privatization would help restore Peru's credibility with investors and
foreign financial institutions.  Because privatization is harder to reverse than less
structural changes, such as reductions in price controls or tariffs, it would help signal
22 The privatization  process  officially  began  in September  1991  with  Decree  #674 (Law for Promotion  of
Private  Investment)  which created  the body in charge  of privatization,  COPRI  (Comisi6n  de Promoci6n  de
la Inversi6n  Privada  or Commission  for Promotion  of Private  Investment). Also  in 1991  Decree  #662
guaranteed  equal  treatment  for domestic  and foreign  investment  and the right of foreign  investors  to
repatriate  their profits  and dividends. In June of 1992  the government  officially  announced  the inclusion  of
SEDAPAL  in the privatization  program  (Resoluci6n  Suprema  #349-92-PCM)  and created a special
committee,  or CEPRI,  to oversee  the process  (CEPRI-SEDAPAL).33
investors that the Fujimori government was indeed committed to sustained reform (World
Bank 1995a). The government's  strong commitment to privatization was evident through
this period. The government's  plan included more than 200 SOEs.  By the end of 1994
over US$3 billion in revenues had been raised from privatization, over US$7 billion by
April 1997 (see statistical appendix table 5).
For all these reasons, private participation in SEDAPAL was politically desirable
at that time, at least to the market-oriented technocrats who were responsible for
designing the concession transaction.  The concession was a logical component of a
sweeping privatization program designed to restore business confidence and remove
bottlenecks to modernization.  Additional funds would allow SEDAPAL to improve
service, which would especially benefit the lower and middle income consumers who
lived in communities that suffered the most frequent interruptions, and who could least
afford to build private cisterns for water storage. Private operation would also remove a
fiscal drain; government transfers to SEDAPAL in 1991 were US$12.2 million (LMG
Consultants 1993). However, political desirability was less strong in the top ranks of the
administration, for reasons we describe below.
The reform was also politically feasible, in the sense that the government would
be able to overcome opposition and implement the concession.  The autogolpe had left
Fujimori in complete control of the apparatus of the state with the backing of the military
and most of the public.  The main political opponents of SEDAPAL's  privatization, the
workers, were not veto players.  High unemployment and the growth of the service and
informal sectors had reduced union membership from one third of the workforce in the
1970's to only 12 percent by the early 1990's.  As we saw in Table 5 unions had low34
public support, in part because they were associated with the discredited traditional
political parties.  Moreover, they were not constituents of Fujimori.  Polls also suggest
strong public support for personnel reductions in SOEs: in January 1991, 75 percent of
those surveyed considered a reduction in the SOE labor force necessary (82 percent of
high-income respondents and 71 percent of low income; Rodrich 1991). Furthermore,
compensation packages from US$5,000 to US$6,000 were promised to redundant
personnel in SEDAPAL, which helped reduce opposition to layoffs. 23
The concession was also credible, in the sense that potential investors had reason
to believe that government would keep its promises to abide by the agreement.
Government had carried through the rest of its reform program as promised, including
selling large and politically important SOEs such as Hierro Peru, Compariia Peruana de
Telefonos and Edelnor and Edegel.  One sign of the government's credibility was that
international investors had been willing to sink large amounts in capital in sales of, for
example, telecommunications and electricity. Another sign of the administration's
credibility was the further drop in the discount on its foreign debt instruments; by the end
of 1995 Peru's external debt was trading at 71 percent of its nominal value. It's possible
that investors might not have seen government's commitment to raise prices as fully
credible in a sector as politically sensitive as water, especially given adverse public
reaction to tariff increases in other services. However, they probably expected that they
could renegotiate their investment obligations under the concession down to levels that
would allow adequate returns (as has occurred in concessions in Argentina and
elsewhere).
23  The  average  annual  wage  in 1991  was  US$4,704.35
Accordingly, based on recommendations of a consultant's study, the govermnent
decided on a thirty-year concession with a required minimum investment program of
US$3 billion.  The concession would be awarded to the bidder offering to meet all the
quality and coverage targets in the contract at the lowest retail tariff.  In November 1994
three international consortiums prequalified to bid on the concession. 24 The successful
groups were headed by Canal de Isabel II from Spain, Compagnie Generale des Eaux
from France and Lyonnaise des Eaux from France. 25 However, the ultimate bid for the
concession itself, however, was postponed until after the 1995 elections. It was then
further delayed, and finally in November 1997 President Fujimori declared the
concession postponed indefinitely. 26 (It was probably not cancelled outright only because
of concerns about litigation by the foreign investors, who are reported to have spent about
US$1 million each in preparing their bids.)  In the next section we explain why the
concession was cancelled.
iv.  Why Was the Operation of SEDAPAL not Privatized?  There are three main
reasons why SEDAPAL's concession was ultimately not implemented. First and
foremost, it became politically undesirable, second the window of opportunity for the sale
closed, and third the most serious problems in the sector were partly alleviated.  Another
24 Bidders had to have experience operating systems with minimum sales of US$180 million and assets
with a net value above US$750 million, in urban centers of more than 4 million inhabitants.
25 The Spanish partnership also included Argentaria (financial company) and Aguas de Barcelona (which is
also a member of the Aguas Argentinas partnership). The Generale des Eaux partnership also included
Thames Water (which operates much of the system for London), Mitsui from Japan, and three Peruvian
companies, Banco de Credito, Cosapi and Gremco. Lyonnaise leads the Aguas Argentinas partnership,
which also includes England Company Water, Mitsubishi from Japan, Grafla  y Montero from Peru and
Aguas de Barcelona.
26 In April 1996 Jorge Gonzilez lzquierdo, the President of the privatization commission, COPRI, stated
that government had decided to postpone the privatization of three controversial and complicated SOEs -
SEDAPAL, the petroleum corporation and a large mining company - until the end of the whole process (El
Comercio April 1996). Later he stated that the government had decided to keep both SEDAPAL's property
and operation public because "...we  think that water is something vital and there are some problems in this
activity that the government must solve..." (Semana Economica #578, June 29, 1997).36
important factor to mention that made the concession difficult from the beginning,
contributing to its postponement and to lose the window of opportunity was the lack of a
"blueprint" or model to follow. In contrast to the other cases, such as
teleconmunications,  there did no exist an international model or "best practice" to help
the team in charge in the design of the concession and regulatory drafts.
As mentioned before, the desirability of water privatization was always weak.
Water had high political saliency for Fujimori's core base of support, Lima's poor. 27 The
concession would deprive the government of this ability to direct investments to areas
with high political payoffs, a factor that has delayed private participation in the
management of water elsewhere, in Mexico City for example.
The benefits of the concession to Fujimori's poor constituents in Lima would be
further reduced by an increase in prices. The concession allowed up to a 40 percent price
increase, which would raise the average residential tariff for water and sewerage from
US$0.30 in 1994 to US$0.42 per M3. According to World Bank calculations, the average
incremental cost for a smaller expansion in the system was US$0.45M 3 (World Bank
1994).28  If this estimate is correct, any private bidder would have been strongly
motivated to renegotiate the agreement to win a higher price or lower investment targets
than allowed under the.  concessions. Although there may have been operational
inefficiencies assumed in the World Bank estimate, marginal costs were indeed high in
Lima because water was in scarce supply, the required expansion was large and so much
of the system had deteriorated and needed replacement. New, deeper wells would have
27 It is also  noteworthy  that  Lima was  not designated  a region  in the 1993  Constitution  enacted  by the
Fujimori  administration,  which  kept SEDAPAL  under  the direction  of MIPRE  rather  than transferring  it to
the municipalities  or provinces  when  responsibility  for the other  water  companies  was moved.37
to be drilled  to tap the reduced  aquifer. From one third to 85 percent of the sewerage
system needed  to be replaced  and half of the over 300 operating  wells  had diminished
yields because of aquifer  depletion  or pumps  beyond  their design  life.
A private operator  would probably  have been able to reduce SEDAPAL's  operating
costs by improving  efficiency,  but the effects  on tariffs would be limited  since  by far the
biggest  part of costs would  be investment. For example,  SEDAPAL's  operating  costs
before interest,  depreciation  and taxes averaged  US $70 million  a year from 1990  to
1993, average  annual projected  investment  during  the first three years of the concession
would  have been  US$ 476 millions. 29
The higher tariffs combined  with connection  charges  would  make water
unaffordable  to many unconnected  poor consumers,  even compared  to water from
vendors. 30 Poorer  and middle-income  consumers  who were already  connected  would
have faced higher bills, not only because  of rate increases  but also with the introduction
of metering  and better bill collection.  SEDAPAL  charged  unmetered,  low-income
consumers  on the assumption  that they used 22 M 3 a month,  but a very large, poor
household  could be using more.
23  Based on a project  to bring  new connections  to over 300,000  persons  and improve  service  by another
300,000  while increasing  water supply  by 5.2M 3 by reducing  water losses  through  rehabilitation  and
consumption  (through  metering).
29US$100  million  a year or US$3  billion  over  30 years to increase  coverage  and US$59  million  a year or
US$1.8 billion in 30 years to improve  the continuity  of service  (Black  and Veatch,  1992).
30  SEDAPAL  assumed  a minimum  water consumption  level of 22 M 3 a month  for low-income  households
for billing  purposes. At 1993  tariffs  (US$0.22  per M3 for domestic  users)  this amounted  to $4.92  a month
or 2.42.1  to 2.92.5  percent of household  income  for the 43 percent  of Lima's households  in the lowest
income category  (US$200-240  a month).  Connection  costs in poor income  neighborhoods  were about
US$850  and could be paid for by a loan,  with a five year  repayment  period and monthly  interest  rate of 1.2
percent,  which meant  that water and sewerage  charges  would  be 16  percent of income for a new
connection.  Raising  tariffs to cover  marginal  cost  would  more  than double  rates. Without  any comparable
increase  in income  or some  sort of subsidy,  poorest  households  would  pay around  5 percent  of their income
for water and sewerage,  or over 18  percent  including  the connection  charge.38
None of this means that poor consumers would not have been willing to pay more
for a connection; a SEDAPAL survey in 1993 found that the average property value of
houses in the pueblos j6venes quadrupled after being connected to piped water (from
US$1,542 to US$6,375).  Moreover, poor consumers already paid high prices for water
from vendors; a survey in December 1993 found that the average price was US$2.50 per
M3.
The cost to the poor could have been made affordable through subsidies, by
including the connection costs in the variable water tariff charged to all consumers, or by
extending longer term, lower interest loans for connections. 31 However, none of these
arrangements were contemplated in the concession agreement, and would not have been
easily added.  Any efficient provider, public or private would have wanted to reduce the
already large cross subsidies in Lima's tariffs.  Industrial tariffs were 130 percent larger
than residential.  An efficient operator would have also wanted to raise metering and
change per meter prices closer to marginal cost, not only to assure a reasonable return on
investment, but also to keep the demand for water down so as to reduce the need for
further costly expansion.  It was therefore inevitable that poorer consumers would face
substantially higher prices, as indeed occurred under public ownership later, reducing the
political benefits of the concession.
Not only would price increases reduce the net benefits from the concession for
lower income consumers, the size of the projected benefits from investment was open to
3  Loans  were in fact offered  to water companies  and consumers  to finance  construction  of primary
networks and to cover investments  in secondary  networks  and costs of connection  through  a government
fund financed  by a Social  Tax, FONAVI.  FONAVI  channeled  about US$1,000 million  to the water sector
at moderately  favorable  interest  rates,  out of which 75% went to customers.  However,  customers  failed  to
repay the loans.  By the end of 1998,  the government  recognized  the big problem  and lunched  a plan to
"recovere  the FONAVI  debts offering  the water companies  the option  to issue shares  in favor of the Central
Government.39
question.  Even if prices could be increased to cover marginal costs, an investor might
well be wary of sinking large sums in non-transferable assets given Peru's weak
institutional environment. Barthelemy 1996 reports that foreign investors had concerns
about the sustainability of Peru's reforms given the concentration of power in the hands
of the President and the weakness of the judiciary and other institutions.  Furthermore,
should demand for new connections be less than expected once prices go up, the operator
might well argue for renegotiation of the investment targets.  In Buenos Aires, for
example, the operator renegotiated the concession contract to win larger price increases
and lower investment commitments than planned partly because high connection charges
proved uncollectable.  The possibility that renegotiation could happen in Lima was
probably not lost on the President and his advisors.
The second reason why the concession for SEDAPAL was postponed and then
abandoned was a problem of timing.  Privatization of water had lower priority than other
sectors.  Although the proposed SEDAPAL concession would remove a fiscal drain and
generate new investment, it would not bring any sales proceeds or other revenues to the
government. In contrast, the sale of electricity, telecoms or mining would attract
investment and also generate substantial funds for the Treasury.  For example, the sale of
35 percent of the telephone company in February 1994 raised US$1.4 billion for the
Treasury and US$ 600 million of new investment. This initial lower priority of
SEDAPAL's privatization worsened by the difficulties faced by the privatization process
in general and by the SEDAPAL's bid process in particular. In addition, as was
mentioned above, there were significant technical difficulties. It was more difficult to40
prepare the privatization of SEDAPAL than the others because of the lack of
international experiences and of an appropriate model to follow.
Notwithstanding the government's best efforts, it proved impossible to privatize
even the top priority SOEs as fast as the timetable required. By the end of 1994 only
about 45 percent of the total value of transactions that ultimately would occur (by April
1997), had occurred (Table 6).  These other higher priority privatizations delayed work
on the SEDAPAL concession which only began in 1993. Also, its relatively weaker
political desirability was reflected in a weak team responsible for the SEDAPAL
concession (CEPRI-SEDAPAL). This group had lower incentives to privatize than the
others and faced strong opposition from some politicians close to the President and to
SEDAPAL. Because the concession would affect an important constituency of the
President, considerable attention was paid to the design of the legal and regulatory
framnework  by top officials in the Ministry of the Presidency (MIPRE) who were close to
Fujimori.  This further delayed the process, and, when the MIPRE officials refused to
approve the bidding and concession documents, ultimately led to the resignation of the
CEPRI-SEDAPAL team responsible for the privatization in April 1995. As a result of the
delays in the privatization of SEDAPAL's operation fell perilously close to the 1995
election.  This was politically risky; a concession would sharply increase prices, effect
that would ran counter to Fujimori's need to win the support of his core constituency in
Lima. Hence the concession lender was postponed.41
Table 6. Proceeds and Investment from Privatization Transactions
(In US$ millions)
Year  Sale  of  Concession  Transfer  Other  TOTAL  Projected
_____  .Shares  C#sio  Revenue  PROCEEDS Investment
1991  $2.59  _  - $2.59  -
1992  $207.53  - $1.39  $208.92  $706.00
1993  $316.70  $20.70  - $6.49  $323.89  $589.34
1994  $2,648.57  - $2.21  $2.52  $2,653.30  $3,137.55
1995  $1,089.01  $48.76  $1.18  $6.45  $1,145.40  $216.07
1996  $2,291.81  $344.20  $1.00  $5.79  $2,642.80  $2,852.20
1997*  $67.13  - - $1.32  $68.45  $218.19
TOTAL  $6,623.34  $413.66  $4.39  $23.96  $7,065.35  $7,719.35
SOURCE:  COPRI
After the elections the concession became less politically desirable because of
growing public disillusionment with privatization. Although a new SEDAPAL
privatization team was appointed in December 1995, government's  interest in the
concession was much weaker after the elections (field interviews).  As table 4 shows,
support for privatization in general peaked among all income groups in 1993 and fell off
gradually, then sharply in 1997. The decline in support stemmed from a perception that
the benefits were concentrated in a small group of foreign investors and wealthy
Peruvians, plus sharp increases in the prices of services, such as telephone and electricity
rates.  The SEDAPAL concession would also have combined large rate increases and
higher returns to investors in the short run, with most consumer benefits coming in the
medium term as major investments are completed.  Support for privatization of
SEDAPAL was never as strong as for other SOEs and fell sharply over time.  In 1989, 4742
percent of those surveyed in Lima supported transferring SEDAPAL to the private sector;
by 1997 this was down to 22 percent (Apoyo Opinion Reports).
Table 7. Rate of Approval of Privatization by Socioeconomic Level in Lima
(percentages)
Level  (Average  Monthly  Sept.  Feb.  Dec.  Dec.  Dec.  Dec.  Dec.
Household  Income)  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Total  52  59  48  49  42  28
High  (US$3,200-5,000')  87  83  84  80  77  65  67
High  middle  (US$750-1,150 2)  65  81  73  64  66  46  42
Low  middle  (US$330-470 3)  55  63  58  45  43  39  25
Low  (US$200-240 4)  37  42  49  36  42  40  19
'Approximately  4.5%  of  total  households  in Lima.  'Approximately  19.5%  of  total  households  in Lima.
3Approximately  33% of  total households  in Lima. 4Approximately  43% of total households  in Lima.
SOURCE:  OPINION  REPORTS  - APOYO  (Income  ranges  from  July 1997.)
Furthermore, support for Fujimori was sharply down by late 1997 (Statistical
Appendix Table 1) and it became even riskier to chance alienating his core supporters,
especially when he was trying to change the constitution so he could run for President
again in 2000.
Since 1997, although several privatization transactions were implemented, they
severely lost public approval (63% of the population was against them in October of
1999) and partly government support, making even more difficult to complete the
concession of SEDAPAL. However, the results of the privatization reform proved a
success and the process continues. Among many other benefits from the process, more
than US$8,000 millions were obtained from privatization transactions (1991-1999) and
two thirds of foreign investment came from privatizations; the government received
US6,391; privatized firms substantially increased internal production and exports; the
Peruvian economy became more competitive (4th in Latin America) and the country-risk43
was reduced; and 410,000 Peruvian citizens and 16,000 workers became shareholders of
privatized firms (Apoyo Comunicaciones 1999). Particularly noteworthy are the results
regarding the coverage, quality, and prices of utilities. A 100% of coverage was achieved
in Lima with the privatization of the electric utilities and almost 50% in the case of
telephones. Furthermore, from 1990 to 1998, water tariffs increased in real terms more
than their privatized counterparts: electricity and telecommunications (17.6% increment
of water tariffs versus -34.6% and -23.1 in the cases of electricity and telephones
respectively).
The third reason why the SEDAPAL concession was not implemented was that
much of the quick gains from reducing the water sector problems were achieved without
it.  The World Bank and other aid agencies put together a US$600 million financing
package to rehabilitate the distribution network for water and sewerage in Lima, expand
connections in the poorest areas, install metering in high consumption areas, and improve
SEDAPAL's efficiency and the legal and regulatory framework for the water system --
all within five years.  Although the package was conditioned to the implementation of
many changes to make privatization possible and contemplated the  concession of
SEDAPAL, this condition was revised to adjust for the changes in the political climate.
The aid-financed program of investment and reforms reduced the pressure for
privatization because it alleviated some of the worse problems of the system.  It was
combined with a program of layoffs and management improvements in SEDAPAL that
eliminated SEDAPAL's losses and improved operations (see Section I11  .iii.).  The
reforms expanded service in the pueblos j6venes for lower price increases than might
have occurred with a concession since recovery of capital costs was not necessary.44
Although the net benefits from a concession would have been much greater, according to
our calculations in section IV above, they would only come in the medium term, after
major investment works were completed.
VI.  CONCLUSION
Although Lima's water system was in near crisis, that was not a sufficient
condition for radical change.  Partial reforms that reduced many of the worst problems
were carried out under public management, partly due to the credible threat of
privatization, but left a quarter of citizens without access to water or sewerage
connections, supplied a service subject to frequent and extended interruptions, and
wasted more than a third of the water in circumstances of very scarce supply.
The fundamental reason for Lima's failure to implement the concession was
geographical - the scarcity of water sources meant that marginal costs were high,
requiring pumping water from deep wells and building adequate storage for dry periods.
High extraction costs were compounded by years of neglect, so that much of the system
needed to be replaced.  To attract a private investor, prices would have to be set to
recover these high costs, including a reasonable return on capital.  Since government had
kept prices well below cost recovery for years, a concession would have required a sharp
and sudden price increase to cover marginal costs.  Not only that, but any forward
looking investor would want to reduce the pace of future investment, by curbing demand
through metering and more effective bill collection based on meters.  This logic would
also argue for reduced cross subsidies, since these reduce the incentive to conserve water.45
Although the ultimate cause of the concession's failure was geographical, the
proximate cause was political.  Privatization of any utility is politically tricky if it
involves higher prices and controversy over ceding monopoly powers to private parties,
especially foreigners.  Private participation in water suffers from all these problems,
magnified by the social importance of water as an essential good and by the lack of
international experience and thus technical difficulties to design a privatization reform in
the sector.  At the same time water offers fewer offsetting benefits compared to other
utilities because it raises less or no revenues that can be used to reward supporters or
compensate losers.  In Lima's case the benefits were further reduced by the likelihood
that the price increases would especially affect the urban poor who were important to the
President's  support base.  Thus, despite initially favorable conditions, the political
equation shifted against private operation of SEDAPAL as elections neared.
The failure to introduce the concession was costly for Lima, and not just because
the welfare gains from the concession, even if the access goals were not fully met, would
have been larger than the gains from the reform.  The cost also included the adverse
effects on health in a city where over 1.7 million people are not connected to water or
sewerage and those who are connected suffer interruptions in water service that last for
months at a time.  In addition, the failure to curb consumption through metering has also
meant that the aquifer continued to be depleted much faster than it was replenished,
especially as the number of connections grew, and hence was increasingly contaminated
by salt from the ocean.
Although the reforms introduced some important improvements in the operation
of SEDAPAL, especially in reducing labor costs, these too were far short of what a46
private operator  might be expected  to implement. Our assumptions  about efficiency
gains under  the concession  projections  were very conservative;  it would  be more realistic
to assume that a profit maximizing  operator  facing  price cap regulation  would sharply
curb unaccounted  for water, and try to minimize  the consumption  of electricity  and other
inputs.32
Our assumptions  about  the benefits  from the concession  do not take into account
Peru's regulatory  weaknesses,  however. The improvements  introduced  since 1992  have
been very partial and left the regulator  vulnerable  to either  political  manipulation  or
capture.  Had the concession  been signed,  the government  might have had greater
motivation to protect the regulator  from capture and the investor  would  had an incentive
to push for safeguards  against  politically  motivated  regulatory  changes. Peru's
institutional  weaknesses,  and in particular  its lack of an autonomous  judiciary,  would
limit how much could have been  achieved. Nevertheless,  considering  the net gain from
private operation in much weaker  institutional  settings  in Africa,  it seems  safe to
conclude  that Lima would  have been  better off with a concession.
32 That there was scope for this is supported by the fact that the cost of intermediate inputs for Santiago's
water and sewerage company were half those of SEDAPAL in 1996 (when Santiago had about I million
connections compared to 823 thousand in Lima).47
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX
TABLE SA-1. RATES OF APPROVAL OF FUJIMORI AS PRESIDENT OF THE COUNTRY (IN
LIMA)
MouitbfYear  1-990  19  1995  1996  1997
January  43  65  60  66  64  75  47
February  35  64  62  58  74  66  46
March  38  53  61  61  66  64  67*
April  49  81  63  60  75  62  48
May  45  76  59  61  80  59  47
June  35  76  66  64  76  65  34
July  31  65  61  65  68  58  23**
August  46  39  62  65  68  77  62  34
September  51  32  74  63  68  78  60  39
October  53  54  68  70  65  76  55  34
November  59  58  65  67  63  70  52  37
December  61  60  64  64  67  73  45  34
*  After the release of the hostages of the Japanese Embassy.
* * After accusations of telephone conversation interventions.
SOURCE: Opinion Reports, APOYO.
TABLE SA-2. METERING OF CONNECTIONS IN 1988
(PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION)
Type of  Connection  Social  Residential  Commercial  Industrial  State  Total
Unnetered  72.4  71.2  62.3  51.6  74.8  70.5
Metered:  27.6  28.8  37.7  48.4  25.2  29.5
Charge according  9.4  16.2  13.6  29.3  12.2  16.1
to meter-reading
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:  "Analysis  of Demand  in Lima and El Callao",  SEDAPAL  Gerencia  de Planeacion  y Presupuesto51
TABLE SA-3.  TRENDS  IN CONNECTIONS,  METERED  CONNECTIONS  AND  METER  READING
t 'l  \ijT( 170 NS  .\I:R/J)  (CNN'CTOAXS  RV  11)
Yl' Iz  R  (mos  f  Ctf}N  VC  AElJ  \.N{",  S,
1987  559.44  56%  NA
1988  607.40  60%  NA
1989  626.59  59%  NA
1990  654.14  57%  11%
1991  678.54  54%  9%
1992  700.16  52%  7%
1993  732.26  50%  4%
1994  762.93  47%  5%
1995  790.69  45%  6%
1996  823.16  39%  8%
1997  839.34  39%  16%
1998  871.72  40%  32%52
TABLE  SA-4.  SEDAPAL'S  ESTIMATED  CONSUMPTION  PER CAPITA  (LITTERS  PER DAY)
DISTRICTS  UNMETERED  CONSUMPTION
SMP  172
Rimac  229
La Molina  560
San  Luis  239
Chorrillos  243
Santiago  de Surco  405




San Isidro  465
Barranco  307
Lima Cercado  372
La Victoria  231
San Miguel  235
Brena  261
Pueblo  Libre  272
Jesus Maria  264
Magdalena  325
Callao  Cercado  243
Bellavista  231
La Perla  254
C. de la Legua  252
La Punta  312
Source:  World  Bank 1994b.53
TABLE  SA-5
MAIN  PRIVATIZED  ENTERPRISES
(In US$  millions)
Enterprise  Date  of sale  Shares  sold  Basis  price  Sale price  Investment
(%)  commitment
Sogewiese  10/6(91  15.0  1.00  1.08
Leasing
Hierroperu  30/10/92  100.0  22.00  120.00  150.00
Cerro  Verde  10/11/93  100.0  30.00  35.44  485.30
Entel/CPT  28/02/94  35.0  both  535.00  2002.00  1800.00
Edelnor  12/07/94  60.0  127.72  176.49  150.00
Edelsur  12/07/94  60.0  129.42  212.12  120.00
Banco  18/04/95  60.0  - 195.70  --
Continental
Egenor  25106/96  60.0  228.20  42.00
SOURCE:  COPRI54
NOTES  ON THE
METHODOLOGY  FOR  MEASURING  THE  WELFARE  GAINS  OF  CONCESSION
A.  Actual Scenario
Since SEDAPAL did not charge separately for sewerage and water, they are
treated as a composite product. To distinguish the differences in behavior and pricing, we
decompose the revenue from water services into domestic, non-domestic, and social
sources. For domestic and non-domestic sources, we further classify them as from
metered and unmetered. In 1988 only 16% of the domestic consumers were charged
based upon meter-reading in 1988 (Table 3.1); and in 1994, 7%.33 Although the company
argued that 29% of the connections were metered, that number did not represent
accurately the number of connections billed based on meter-reading. This is because
meter connections were charged by the maximum between the company's estimated
consumption and the actual reading.
We calculated water revenues based on the quantity and the average price
(reported by SEDAPAL). For the period before 1994, due to data limitation, industrial
discharges are calculated based on the quantity reported by the company and the total
revenue recorded by the World Bank 34. From 1994 on, the data used are from SEDAPAL
reports. Connections and "other revenue" are the residual, its price being the consumer
price index. 35
When a connection is metered, the demand elasticity is assumed to be -0.30  for
domestic usage, -0.20 for non-domestic usage. 36 When a connection is not metered, in
contrast, the elasticity is assumed to be zero. This assumption aims to capture the idea
that the prices underlying unmetered connections are represented by a fixed charge and a
marginal price of zero.
Excess demand for water is based on service coverage and water continuity. The
percentage of people not served and the hours of interruption of service are translated into
cubic meters of excess demand for water. 37 There are no specific records of discontinuity
of service in Lima except by the Living Standards Measurement Survey done by the
World Bank in 1991, which suggested that 48 percent of Peru's population received
water service for less than 12 hours a day, and, another 28 percent, less than 6 hours a
33 Analysis  of the Financial  Situation  of SEDAPAL.  (1987-2003).  World  Bank,  Luz Marina  Gonzales
34 Analysis  of the Financial  Situation  of SEDAPAL.  (1987-2003).  Luz Marina  GonzAles
3  The issue  of connection  fee is not treated  explicitly  in this analysis.
36 To our knowledge,  there is no study  of the demand  elasticity  for Lima.  We thus had to somewhat
arbitrarily  assign  a plausible  from  the literature  about water  demand.  We shall use sensitivity  analysis,
however,  to check the robustness  of the welfare  results.
37 Note that the rising  tariffs did not bring about  the reduction  of monthly  consumption  per connection.
While  the tariff rose between  1992  and 1996,  the average  monthly  consumption  per connection  increased
for two years and then decreased  for another  two  years.  This suggests  that the unmet  demand  should  be
treated  as excess  demand.55
day. We also know  that some  districts  of Lima  in 1997  did no receive  service  for more
than two months.  To be consistent  with these observations,  we thus used 15 hours a day
estimated  by the Consortia  for SEDAPAL  Privatization.
B.  Counterfactual  Scenario
The bidding  variable  of the contract  was the tariff. The operator  could increase
prices at the beginning  of the contract  and then adjusted  them every year by inflation  plus
K%. K must be equal  to zero for the first five years  and from then on, it will vary
depending  on investment  and efficiency  improvements.  The bidding  documents  mandate
that the maximum  price increase  for the first year  would  be 40%; and the percentage  of
price increase  we used was 38.24%.  This increase,  well within  the ceiling  of price
increase  of 40%, allows  the price to be equal to the estimated  long-term  marginal  cost
(World Bank  estimated  it to be $0.45 or 0.99 soles in 1994).  After the first-time  increase,
the price increase  was assumed  to be zero  per year afterwards.
The bidding  document  also provides  some  minimum  requirements,  which are
used for the assumptions  about  the counterfactual.  The service  coverage  is required to
increase  from 15 to 24 hours a day in 5 years, and the market  coverage,  from 75% to 95%
in ten years. These conditions  are directly  quantified  in output quantity  and excess
demand  under the counterfactual.  In addition,  unaccounted-for  water is required  to drop
from 36% to 25%, and metered connections  to rise from 38% to 95% of total connections
in ten years. Finally, in terms of ownership  of new issues,  the qualified  international
operator must retain at least 25% of newly-issued  shares.  Employees  must have at least
5% of new shares. And at least 20%  of the new shares  must be issued in the stock
exchange.  In the base scenario,  we assumed  that the international  corporation  retains 50%
of the stocks.
Although  the contract  would  be extended  for 30 years, we are projecting  only up
to the year 2004, eight years after  the end of the actual series,  and 10  years after the
beginning of the presumed  concession.  Simulation  about further  time series would  entail
too much prediction  error; besides,  large discounting  factors  beyond  the year 2002 would
render this omission  unimportant.
Without  evidence  that SEDAPAL  will improve  its performance  at a faster pace
than in the past years under the factual  of public ownership,  we project  the future of the
factual scenario  with linear  trends based  on data on 1988 and 1996. For prices, we used
the data after 1990  because of the World  Bank requirements  that tariffs rise to cover
marginal costs. Unit costs of labor and intermediate  inputs  for the projection  periods are
assumed  to be the same as the actual  in 1996.
The deposit  and the loan rate are assumed  to be equal under the public  and private
scenarios.  The loan rate was set to the average  between 7.32%  for multilateral
organization  loans and 11  % for other sources.  The Consortia  estimated  this rate for the
Privatization  of SEDAPAL,  using the last 50 Latin American  bonds issued  plus a country56
risk of 3.5% and an industry risk of 4.5%.  A summary of the main assumptions used
for the counterfactual is presented in table 3.2.
ASSUMPTIONS  USED  IN THE  COUNTERFACTUAL  SCENARIO
Key elements:  Assumptions  for counterfactual  time  series  (ie., the private enterprise  scenario):
Prices  of water:  Increase  of 38.24%  in prices  on the first  year to reach  the long-term  marginal  costs
level.  In all the following  years,  prices  only  keep  up with inflation.
Quantity  of water  Continuity:  increase  continuity  to 24 hours  a day in five  years.
Coverage:  Domestic  water coverage  increases  to 85% in five years  and 95% in 10
years. All other  categories  are assumed  to increase  based  on the historical  trend.
Investment  Under  both  the factual  and  the counterfactual,  retained  earnings  are used for
investment.  Additional  funding  for investment  is financed  through loans.  Capital
stock  was also adjusted  by inflation. Paid-in  capital  increases  by US$ 100
millions  in the first  five years.  At the beginning  of the contract,  it increases  by
US$  25 millions  and the following  five years by US$ 15 millions.
Unit  cost of  The  unit cost  of intermediate  inputs  are assumed  to 5 percent  lower  for 1995  and
intermediate  inputs  1996,  then stay  constant  after 1996  (i.e.,  the projection  period).  This  assumption  is
somewhat  arbitrary,  but we shall  rely on sensibility  analysis  and it turns out not
important  for the welfare  outcomes.
Unit cost  of labor  The unit cost  of labor  is assumed  to be the same  as the actual.  Since  the factual
already  witnessed  a very large  reduction  in labor  force, there  is no reason  to
assume  that  private  ownership  could slash  labor  force  further.
Opportunity  costs of  The same  as the actual.  There  is no reason  to assume  that  the market  rate would
working  capital  change  with  the reform  of SEDAPAL.Policy Research Working Paper  Series
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